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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUDEAN H. COX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
EDWARD C. CARLISLE, Mayor of ) Z ^ ° ' 
Manti City, MANTI CITY, a mu- ; J 
nicipal corporation, HENRY HEN-
NINGSON, JOHN McINTOSH 
and ED NIELSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Divorced from emotive statements about falling fences, 
neat furrows, equipment invasions, and "extraordinary circum-
stances," the present case is concerned with the question of 
whether a person can acquire public property merely by claiming 
ownership. 
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Defendants-respondents—hereinafter called "defendants" 
—agree with the plaintiff's statement of facts insofar as it 
repeats occurrences at the trial; however, defendants do not 
agree with the conclusions drawn from some of the recited 
testimony. The chosen excerpts do not give an accurate picture 
of the total impression which must have been given to the 
trial judge. Moreover, with respect to the question of occu-
pancy, the plaintiff was stingy in her references to documentary 
evidence in itself sufficient to sustain the findings of fact. 
Manti City was incorporated in 1851. In 1872 the property 
upon which the townsite was located was conveyed to Luther 
T. Tuttle, then mayor of Manti, by patent from the United 
States of America (Ex. 7), pursuant to an act of Congress of 
March 2, 1867, generally referred to as the Townsite Act (14 
Stat. 541; 43 U.S.C § 718). 
No direct evidence was introduced at the trial as to the 
date upon which the townsite was entered. However, the trial 
judge, with plaintiff's acquiescence, requested defendants' 
counsel to find out when the entry was made and whether a 
plat was entered along with it, and to let the court know (R. 
173; Unpaged minute entry of June 15, 1959). The Director 
of the Bureau of Land Management of the United States De-
partment of the Interior wrote to counsel that Cash Certificate 
No. 636 was issued to Mayor Tuttle on May 15, 1871. Copies 
of the letter were furnished to the court and plaintiff's counsel, 
and it is reprinted herein as Appendix A. The letter indicates 
that no declaratory statement was filed and that a cash entry 
was made. 
Mayor Tuttle deeded Parcel 99 to William Bench under 
2 
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date of December 14, 1871, and Parcel 113 to William A. Cox 
under date of December 21, 1871. Both deeds described the 
property by reference to "Plat A of Manti City Survey." The 
deed to Parcel 99 (Ex. 6) described the land as being "35 rods 
north and south by 46 rods east and west containing ten acres", 
and the deed to Parcel 113 (Ex. 8) described the land as "being 
46 rods east and wrest by 6 rods north and south containing 
one 106/160 acres." These descriptions are in conformance 
with the official plat (Ex. 5) and are accurate only if there is 
a 66-foot strip between Parcels 99 and 113. 
One of the documents introduced in evidence by the 
plaintiff was an abstract of title (Ex. l ) . It shows that Parcels 
99 and 113, beginning with the 1871 conveyance by Mayor 
Tuttle, were always described in such a way that a strip of 
land 66 feet wide kept them apart—even after both parcels 
came into common ownership. There has never been a convey-
ance in which anyone claimed to be the owner of the 66-foot 
wide strip (or street) between Parcels 99 and 113. 
Although these deeds from the mayor to the original occu-
pants do not conclude plaintiff, as res judicata, from now 
claiming that her predecessors were the occupants of the street 
at the time of the entry, the deeds constitute evidence that the 
grantees were not in possession of the street at the time of the 
entry. Other documents enhance the value of the deeds for this 
purpose. The official record of the declaratory statements made 
by claimants at the time of the land adjudications, and the 
official record of the adjudications were introduced in evidence 
as defendants' Exhibits 10 and 9, respectively. 
The record of declaratory statements, Page 181, Entry 
3 
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59 (Ex. 10), shows the claim of William Bench to Parcel 99 
"containing 10 acres." The adjudication record (Ex. 9) , Page 
132, Entry 59, shows William Bench to have appeared in court 
and "claimed to be the rightful owner of possession of land 
as set forth in statement, to wit, * * * Parcel 99 being 35 
rods north and south by 46 rods east and west containing 10 
acres." In the same book, Page 156, Entry 166, William A. 
Cox is shown to have appeared in court and claimed to be the 
rightful owner of possession of various parcels of land, among 
which was Parcel No. 113 "being 46 rods east and west by 
6 rods north and south, containing one and Il6/l60th acres." 
No claim was made by either Mr. Bench or Mr. Cox to the 
property in the platted street lying between Parcels 99 and 113. 
Exhibit 5, sheets A through D, introduced by the defend-
ants, is the official Manti plat and map. It shows Parcel 99 
to contain 10 acres, to be 35 rods north and south by 46 rods 
east and west and to be separated by a street between it and 
Parcel 113. Parcel 113 is shown on the map to be 6 rods north 
and south by 46 rods east and west and to contain one and 
Il6/l60ths acres. The plat was adopted as the official Manti 
City plat on January 25, 1892, and was filed for record on 
January 29, 1892. The drawing contains the following cer-
tificate: 
"I hereby certify that this is a correct Map of a 
survey made by me in the month of February, 1871. 
E. W. Fox 
County Surveyor" 
These documents constitute the only direct evidence as 
to occupancy of the 66-foot street at the time of entry in the 
Utah land office by Mayor Tuttle. Both sides introduced 
.4 
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testimony of inhabitants of the area—plaintiff's witnesses say-
ing there was no street, and defendants' that there was, at 
various times in years gone by. The testimony referred to known 
landmarks, and from the testimony as a whole the court could 
justifiably conclude that there was a street used by the inhabi-
tants of Manti some time after the entry. While the excerpts 
quoted by the plaintiff in her brief might raise some question 
as to the parcels that were being talked about by the witnesses, 
the entire testimony has to be read, and the plaintiff cannot 
successfully attack the testimony by slighting references to 
small portions. The evidence shows that there was a street. 
One witness called by the plaintiff, H. R. Clark, testified, 
in effect, that there was a road running west to the Cox property 
line where it ended abruptly, somewhat like an aircraft runway 
(R. 109). This type of street taxes the imagination. 
Mr. William Terry Hall testified that there was a road 
separating Parcels 113 and 99, that he used it to haul hay, that 
the use was made without asking anyone for the privilege, that 
no one ever tried to stop him, and that he understood, from 
what his father told him that there was a platted road through 
that area (R. 59, 60, 62, 64 and 67). 
One of plaintiff's witnesses, Fred W. Cox, testified that 
the lane ran between Parcels 99 and 113, that it was traveled 
some, but that it was never fenced, "only on one side, over in 
on Parcel 113" (R. 135). 
In March, 1910, property owners within a section of Manti 
City petitioned the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District for disconnection of certain territory from the City of 
5 
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Manti (Ex. 2). The action was initiated pursuant to § 288 
et seq., Compiled Laws of 1907, which is substantially the 
same as the present Chapter 4, Title 10, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
The prayer of the petition was that: 
* * * t ^
 c i e rk 0f said court cause notice to be 
given of the filing and purpose of this petition in the 
manner provided by law and that after the hearing 
hereon and the proceedings had in conformity with 
the requirements of the statute in such case made and 
provided, that the court make a decree disconnecting 
and detaching the said described propery from said 
Manti City." 
The City of Manti was served with summons but did 
not answer the petition, and on April 4, 1910, the city's default 
was entered. 
Other evidence related to the Cox farm and what the 
plaintiff and her husband, Grant Cox, had done with it. Plaintiff 
testified that she was born in 1912, could remember back as 
far back as 1919, but to her recollection there was never a road 
between Parcels 99 and 113 (R. 88). She agreed with her 
counsel that the premises had been improved "by leveling and 
placing fertilizer on them" (R. 94). 
Grant Cox, the plaintiff's husband, was also her witness. 
He testified that he and his wife had occupied the property 
since about 1948 or 1949. They had improved the lands by 
changing the irrigation system; equipping a well with a pump; 
constructing a pond; and putting in cement ditches, risers and 
headgates. Since 1948 they had spent in the neighborhood of 
$15,000.00 on the land (R. 114). But this amount was spent 
6 
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on the entire 80 acres owned by the Coxes, not on the 11 and 
H6/l60ths acres included in Parcels 99 and 113, and cer-
tainly not on the 66-foot by 759-foot Manti City street. Mr. 
Cox testified that six or seven years before the trial he had 
been told by one of the city councilmen that the city intended 
to build a road between Parcels 113 and 99 (R. 117), that in 
January of 1959 he noted that the defendants had knocked 
down his fence and had run a grader through some alfalfa 
and had filled in a ditch (R. 118). He said the placing of a 
road would affect the leveling of the ground and that it would 
have to be re-leveled (R. 118), but that he could not estimate 
the amount of damage he had suffered because of the destroyed 
fences, the damaged ditches and the cut into the drain (R. 
120). It would take $10 or $15 to repair the fence (R. 120), 
half a day to fill up the hole that had been dug through the 
field (R. 121) and about $10 to clean out the ditches. 
On cross examination Mr. Cox testified that the $15,000.00 
he was talking about was the cost of improving approximately 
80 acres in the vicinity. Mr. Cox also testified that the land was 
re-leveled in 1955 (R. 126) which, according to his own testi-
mony, would have been sometime after the city first put him 
on notice of its claim to the road (R. 117). He also testified 
that the pond and the pipe, the cement pipe and the cement 
ditches were put in after the city had told him that they 
wanted to build a road between Parcels 99 and 113 (R. 126). 
But he was not very clear as to just what effect the roadway 
would have on his irrigation system (R. 127). While he 
thought that putting in a road would "cut the value down 
quite a bit," there was no testimony by him or by any appraiser 
as to how much it would cut it down (R. 128). 
7 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The evidence supports the court's finding that a 66-foot 
street existed between Parcels 99 and 113 at the time of the 
entry of Mayor Tuttle under the Townsite Act. 
2. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
there was no abandonment or vacation of the street. 
3. The evidence supports the court's finding that the 
defendants are not estopped from claiming title to and opening 
the street. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDING 
THAT A 66-FOOT STREET EXISTED BETWEEN 
PARCELS 99 AND 113 AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF 
MAYOR TUTTLE UNDER THE TOWNSITE ACT. 
Plaintiff and defendants seem to agree that the Utah law 
relating to rights of occupants under the Townsite Act of 1867 
is set out in Hall et al. v. North Ogden City et al., 109 Utah 
325, 175 P.2d 703 (1946). There it was held that a conveyance 
by the probate judge, acting as trustee, to a city or town in 
contravention of the rights of the occupant as of the date of 
the entry, was void. The case also held that although a claimant 
had presented a claim for and participated in an adjudication 
as to certain properties, this was not res judicata as to adjacent 
land claimed by the city to have been dedicated as public streets. 
8 
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In the Hall case, however, it was stipulated that, except 
for one small tract, none of the lands had ever been opened 
up or used as streets by the public, and the only evidence, 
apparently, as to that tract, was that it had never been opened 
up as a street. The plaintiff here doesn't have such a stipu-
lation or such proof. On the other hand, there is enough 
evidence against her to support—even require—a finding that 
the plaintiff and her predecessors were not in occupancy of 
the disputed strip at the time of entry under the Townsite Act. 
First, there is the official plat of Manti City as introduced 
in evidence at the trial (Defendants' Exhibit 5). This map 
shows a 66-foot street between Parcels 99 and 113. There is 
a certificate on the exhibit that it is a correct map of a survey 
made by the County Surveyor in February, 1871, about three 
months prior to the entry. At the trial, this map was the most 
reliable probative evidence of the existence of streets and the 
occupancy of lands in Manti City at the time of the entry. 
It has been held, in a case decided under the Townsite 
Act, that such a map in prima facie evidence of the facts shown 
in it. In Placer County et al. v. Lake Tahoe Ry. and Trans-
portation et al, 58 Cal. App. 764, 209 Pac. 900 (1922), there 
was a dispute as to whether lands platted as a public common 
had been occupied at the time of the entry. The court said: 
"In the first place, it is to be observed that a map 
made in 1863 was introduced in evidence and thereon 
Block 6 was marked and designated as public common 
and the Bethel map, as seen, corresponds in that par-
ticular with said map of 1863. We refer to the last 
mentioned map because it is stated by counsel for the 
defendants that there is no evidence to show that 
9 
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prior to the survey of the townsite made by Bethel in 
1871 Block 6 constituted a public common and because, 
also, they contend that the mere fact that Bethel 
marked and designated Block 6 on his map as public 
common is not evidence that the block was previously 
regarded as public common. Now, as to the Bethel 
map on which the whole of Block 6 is marked desig-
nated as public common, said map having been made 
by and under the authority of the act of the legislature 
of 1867 and 1868, supra, constitute, by virtue of the 
provisions of section 3 of said act, 'prima facie evi-
dence of the content and correctness thereof in all the 
courts of this state.' Hence the burden was upon the 
defendant mercantile company to overthrow or over-
come, by competent evidence, the fixed probative effect 
imparted by the law to said map and the field notes 
made at the same time. This burden the mercantile 
company failed to sustain." 
Utah, too, has a statute which makes the surveyor's map 
of 1871 prima facie evidence of its contents. It is provided 
in 78-25-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
"Entries in public or other official books or records, 
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer 
of this state or by any other person in the performance 
of a duty specially enjoined by the law, are prima 
facie evidence of the facts stated therein." 
It was the County Surveyor's duty to make surveys and record 
them. See Territory of Utah, Compiled Latvs of 1876, §§ 226-
235. 
Apart from statute, however, the 1871 map—the authen-
ticity of which has not been challenged, and which was 
recognized by the Manti City council in adopting the map as 
the official plat of Manti City in 1892—is competent evidence 
10 
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of the facts shown on the map, according to the overwhelming 
weight of authority, ancient and modern. 
The general rule is stated in an annotation, "Admissibility 
in evidence of ancient maps and the like/' 46 A.L.R. 2d 1318, 
1320: 
"An exception to the general rule which requires 
maps, surveys, and the like, to be authenticated by the 
testimony of the party making the same exists where 
the documents are ancient. Maps, surveys, etc., pur-
porting to be thirty years old or more are said to prove 
themselves and are admissible in evidence without the 
ordinary requirements as to the proof of execution or 
handwriting if relevant to the inquiry, when produced 
from proper custody, on their face free from suspicion, 
and authorized or recognized as official documents/' 
The plat and map of Manti City, prepared in February, 
1871, by E. W. Fox, County Surveyor, meets the requirements 
set out in the reported cases. The map, therefore, is evidence 
that there was a 66-foot street between Parcels 99 and 113 
at the time of the entry by Mayor Luther T. Tuttle. 
And the map isn't the only evidence. The conduct of 
plaintiff's predecessors would lead one to believe that there 
was a street separating Parcel 99 from 113. As pointed out 
in the Statement of Facts, William Bench in his declaratory 
statement, and both William Bench and William H. Cox in 
the land adjudication proceedings, described their property 
in the same way as it was shown on the map: same dimensions, 
same acreage. Neither Mr. Cox nor Mr. Bench said anything 
to the court about being entitled to the possession of the 
66-foot strip between Parcels 99 and 113, nor to any part 
of it. A fact finder would have to leave the realm of reality to 
11 
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avoid reaching the conclusion that the strip wasn't claimed 
because the claimants knew it was a city street. 
To overcome this evidence of the County Surveyor, the 
council of Manti City (which adopted the plat as official), 
and the declaratory statement and the statements before the 
probate court, the plaintiff has introduced not a trace of 
evidence relating to occupancy of the street at the time of entry. 
There was some testimony by plainiff's witnesses, it is 
true, to the effect that there never was a street between Parcels 
99 and 113. But their memories didn't go back beyond the 
1890's, and some of the testimony doesn't appear to have any 
probative value. For instance, Mrs. Cox, the plaintiff, couldn't 
remember past 1918—some 47 years after the entry. Even if 
testimony about the conditions in 1892 were relevant to prove 
conditions in 1871, nevertheless the defendants introduced 
testimony from disinterested witnesses to the effect that there 
was a street (admittedly not paved, curbed and guttered as 
are modern streets in modern cities) for a long time after 
1871. Could this court, on that state of the evidence, direct 
a trial court to find that there was no street between Parcels 
99 and 113 at the time of entry; and, beyond that, to find 
that plaintiff's predecessors occupied the strip? 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ABANDONMENT OR 
VACATION OF THE STREET. 
12 
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Under the present Utah statute, cities and towns may 
vacate public streets only by ordinance (10-8-8 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953). The requirement that the vacation of streets 
by a city be done by ordinace first came into Utah law by 
Chapter 123, Laws of Utah, 1917, § 206 x 8. Prior to that 
time the statute had provided only that cities and towns might 
vacate streets, without specifying the method. 
Inasmuch as there is no evidence that any ordinance was 
ever adopted or other official action taken, to vacate the street 
in question, plaintiff must rely upon some act of the city in 
carrying out an intention to abandon the street, and this prior 
to adoption of the 1917 amendment. 
Plaintiff apparently seeks to become owner of a city street 
by virtue of the 1910 disconnection proceeding, though her 
theory is not clear to defendants since the 1910 decree did 
nothing more than remove a large parcel of property from 
Manti City. The street was "disconnected" from Manti—but 
it continued to connect two sides of Manti. The southern 
boundary of the disconnected portion was not a straight line, 
and Manti's northern boundary after the disconnectoin looked 
something like this: 
B 
The street connects sides A and B. (See Exhibits 2 and 5). 
Even if the court should conclude that the city has no 
power to open or maintain a street outside the city limits, this 
13 
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would still not help the plaintiff. The most that would happen 
would be that the street as street might go to Sanpete County, 
while the strip as real property would remain in Manti City. 
In Odom v. Wood, 111 S.W. 2d 165 (Mo. App. 1944) it 
was held that upon separation of lands from a city the right 
to streets within the separated area vested in the county. And 
in Knight v. Thomas, 35 Utah 470, 101 Pac. 383 (1909) this 
court held that upon vacation of a street the right to occupy 
and use the land is in the owner of the fee. The court said: 
"If all the interest which the city had in and to the 
land was only with respect to the public way on the 
land, then on vacation of the street, all its interest in 
and to the land ceased. * * * When the street is 
vacated, the right to occupy and use the land belongs 
to him in whom the fee is—the city, or the original 
landowner if it was reserved by him and not conveyed, 
or to the abutting property owners—and the land is 
subject to all the use and enjoyment and burdens of 
other lands; and // the fee is in the city the land is }ust 
as much real property as is other lands owned by the 
city." (Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, there is no evidence that an ordinance was 
adopted by Sanpete County abandoning or vacating the street, 
if it should be assumed that Sanpete County, after the dis-
connection, was the proper public body to do it. Prior to 1911 
the statute regulating the power of counties to abandon high-
ways provided as follows: 
"All highways once established must continue to be 
highways until abandoned by order of the Board of 
County Commissioners of the county in which they 
are situated, by operation of law; or by judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction; provided, that a road 
14 
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not used or worked for a period of five years ceases 
to be a highway." Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, § 
1116. 
In 1911 ,the year after the disconnection proceeding, the 
statute was amended by Chapter 142, Laws of Utah, 1911, to 
read as follows: 
"All highways once established must continue to be 
highways until abandoned by order of the Board of 
County Commissioners of the county in which they 
are situated, or by judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction.'' (Cf. 27-1-3 Uth Code Annotated 1953.) 
To prove abandonment or vacation of the street the 
plaintiff must prove some affirmative act on the part of the 
city or the county indicating an intention to abandon. If she 
relies upon the action of the county, it must be upon some 
unofficial act or non-user for a five-year period prior to 1911. 
This she cannot do, since the county did not become involved 
until after the 1910 disconnection. There has been no statute 
providing that city streets may be abandoned by non-user for 
five or any other number of years. 
The question of what is necessary to constitute abandon-
ment of the street by a city was considered in Tooele City v. 
Elkington et al, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941). This 
court distinguished earlier cases between strictly private parties, 
where conduct of the city had been a factor and seemed to 
indicate that a good deal more than non-user would be required 
if an adverse title were asserted against a city itself. 
In the present case plaintiff must rely solely upon the fact 
that for a number of years the city did not improve and 
maintain the public street. Moreover, this would have to have 
15 
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been for a number of years prior to 1917, because since then 
cities have not been able to abandon or vacate a street by any 
other methon than by ordinance. (See 10-8-8 U.C.A. 1953, 
and its history in Tooele City v. Elkington, supra). 
To establish abandonment of the street, the plaintiff must 
show not only non-user but an intention to abandon. It has 
been stated that non-user is only an evidentiary fact aiding in 
the resolution of the question of intention. It has also been 
held that non-use, coupled with failure to remove obstructions 
erected by abutting owners and others has been held not to 
amount to abandonment and that an intention to abandon 
is not established by negative or equivocal acts. 11 McQuillan 
on Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) § 30.182; 1 Antieau on 
Municipal Corporation Law 580. 
Although the statutes prior to 1917 did not prescribe the 
method by which a street would have to be vacated by a city, 
"vacation" is an "affirmative act." 11 McQuillan on Municipal 
Corporations (3d Ed.), supra; it ordinarily describes "termi-
nation of the existence of a highway by direct action of the 
public authorities." Bond v. Green et al., 189 Va. 23, 52 S.E. 
2d 169, 172. There is no evidence that anything was done 
by Manti City or Sanpete County to vacate the street. The 
plat and the abstracts, as well as the property descriptions 
in all conveyances, showed the street, and all conveyances 
of property were made with relation to it. Accordingly, it 
would seem that there was no vacation, that the street con-
tinued in existence, and that the city owned the fee, unless 
the city is estopped from claiming title to the strip and the 
right to open the street. 
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Although this court has not set out just what is necessary 
for a city to do to abandon a street, it has recognized that 
different rules govern the abandonment or vacation of city 
streets than the abandonment of highways by a county. In 
Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 Pac. I l l , 
115 (1909), decided during the period when a county could 
abandon roads by five-years' non-use, the court said: 
* * * the legislature has always treated streets 
as being controlled by different provisions than those 
which affect county highways. In view of these pro-
visions, and others which require no special mention, 
we are of the opinion that the legislature intended the 
streets in cities and towns should be governed by a 
different rule with regard to the abandonment thereof 
than are roads and highways in the county outside 
of such cities and towns. The reason for such distinc-
tion is clearly pointed out by some of the authorities 
heretofore cited as well as in those hereafter noticed. 
But independently of such reasons, if the legislature 
has made such a difference (and we think it has), then 
it becomes our duty to enforce it." 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING TITLE TO AND OPENING THE STREET. 
The plaintiff's most fervent argument is based upon what 
she calls "extraordinary circumstances" which should estop 
the city from opening the street. She relies upon the decision 
of this court in Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pac. 
766, (1917), seeing in the instant case "extraordinary circum-
stances" like those in Wall. We don't agree. 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Wall v. Salt Lake City, supra, there was affirmative 
misleading conduct, the city having actively led the plaintiff 
or her predecessors to expend money in subdividing and selling 
the lots, and to advance money on security of a mortgage. This 
had been done after several contacts had been made with the 
city and the city had approved a subdivision the existence of 
which was inconsistent with the location of a street thereafter 
claimed by the city. In Wall v. Salt Lake City, supra, the court 
correctly held that the defendants were estopped from claiming 
the street. 
There were extraordinary factors present in that case: 
active misleading by the city; expenditure of large sums of 
money in reliance upon the city's action; taxation of the 
property in question to the land owners over a number of years; 
and collection and use of the taxes by the city. 
In the present case those factors are absent. We have, 
at most, non-action by the city with respect to maintaining 
the street between Parcels 99 and 113. In addition, the evidence 
as to improvements is of an equivocal character; there is no 
evidence of substantial monetary loss to the defendants; there 
is evidence that many of the improvements relied upon by 
the plaintiff as a basis for estoppel were made after the city 
had given notice of its intention to re-open the street; in 
continued transfers of the property plaintiff's predecessors 
have recognized the existence of the street; no one in the 
chain of title has paid taxes on the property or sought to have 
it assessed; and they have had the benefits of possession and 
use without paying rent. 
Plaintiff's case is weaker than the one held by this court 
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in Tooele City v. Elkington, supra, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 
406 (1941), to be insufficient to raise an estoppel. There the 
court said: 
"In the case at bar, the consideration given the city 
by Elkington was small, if anything; the deed was made 
in contravention of the statute; there is no evidence that 
the property had been assessed against the defendants 
or their predecessor's interests; the time element is 
short; and there was not a replatting or a change in 
the whole neighborhood to the benefit of all adjacent 
landowners." 
Moreover, in the Elkington case, the defendants relied 
on an estoppel created by the actual giving of a deed by the 
City of Tooele. The only stronger element here, from plaintiff's 
standpoint, is that the non-user was for a longer period. But 
non-user, no matter how long continued, is usually held not 
to be a sufficient ground for raising an estoppel to prevent a 
city from opening a city street. 
Even the annotations cited by plaintiff in her brief pre-
ponderantly support the proposition that the mere fact that 
the municipality has permitted a platted street or alley to 
remain unopened over a long period of years will not estop 
it from opening such street or alley. And those cases holding 
that non-user or inaction on the part of the city may be suffi-
cient to raise an estoppel, also require a finding that failure 
to raise the estoppel would result in great damage to the 
persons in possession (171 A.L.R. 110). 
A thread running throughout the estoppel cases is the 
idea that it would be grossly unfair to permit the city to 
change its position. Courts will not permit such a change if 
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great damage would result to the other party and that the 
public interests are outweighed by this great damage. In the 
present case plaintiff's evidence was skimpy at best as to just 
what effect the street would have upon her ability to farm, 
and to utilize the irrigation system, the pond, the concrete 
pipes and what-have-you. She failed to differentiate between 
the portion of her $15,000 spent upon the 80-acre tract and 
the portion spent on the city's 66 by 759-foot strip. She failed 
to differentiate between the amounts spent before and the 
amounts spent after the city notified Mr. Cox of its intention 
to open the street. 
We are confident that if this court were sitting as the 
trier of fact it would not, under those circumstances, raise an 
estoppel against defendants. But this court is not sitting as 
the trier of fact. To reverse the trial judge this court must 
not only regard the facts as sufficient for an estoppel, but 
hold that on such evidence it is mandatory that a trial court 
find "extraordinary circumstances" and give the public's 
property to private parties without compensation. The plain-
tiff's evidence just isn't that good or that much. It's equivocal, 
thin, and unconvincing. 
The only thing left upon which plaintiff can rely is the 
1910 disconnection proceeding. And she seems to contend 
that the defendants are bound not only by the judgment but 
by the statements in the petition. This is not the law. Although 
summons was served upon the defendant Manti City, it did 
not answer and default was entered against it. Thereafter the 
proceeding went ahead, apparently without the participation 
of the city, and certainly without litigation of any of the facts 
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upon which the judgment was based. The prayer was only 
that the property be disconnected from the city, and the judg-
ment did not and could not go beyond the prayer of the 
complaint. Section 3187 of the Compiled Laws of 1907 (in 
effect at the time of the proceeding) provided: 
'The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no 
answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have de-
manded in his complaint; * * * 
Plaintiff seems to argue in her brief that the disconnection 
proceeding somehow had the effect of depriving the city of 
title to a street—a fee title it had received by patent from the 
United States to the Mayor of Manti City in 1872. She would 
have judgment go far beyond that prayed in the complaint, 
solely on the basis of some statements in the petition, one 
of the signers of which was interested only in escaping a tax 
burden (R. 146). 
The judgment cannot have any effect as res judicata on 
the question of the ownership of the street by the city. As 
stated in the Resetatement of Judgments, § 68(2): 
"A judgment on one cause of action is not con-
clusive in asubsequent action on a different cause of 
action as to questions of fact nor actually litigated and 
determined in the first action." 
The reasons for the rule are set out in Comment D to 
§ 68, in part as follows: 
" * * * The result is different, however, as to the 
effect of the judgment upon other causes of action. The 
defendant is not precluded from interposing a defense 
to the subsequent action which he might have inter-
posed but did not interpose in the first action. 
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"Although it is not unfair to the losing party to hold 
that any question of fact actually determined in the 
action shall be conclusive against him in a subsequent 
action between the parties based upon a different cause 
of action, it would be unfair to him to hold that he 
is precluded from relying upon facts which might 
have been but were not determined in the prior action. 
If the defendant fails to interpose a defense in the 
prior action and judgment is given against him, the 
original cause of action is merged in the judgment; 
but there is no reason why he should not make the 
defense when sued upon a different cause of action. 
He may have various reasons for not interposing the 
defense in the first action and for permitting the 
plaintiff to obtain a judgment against him in that action. 
It may be that the action involves so small an amount 
that a defense to the action would cost him more than 
he would lose by failing to defend. * * * It would be 
most unjust to him to hold that his failure to defend 
should have the same result as though he had inter-
posed a defense and it was found that the matters 
alleged in the defense were untrue." 
The only purpose of the disconnection proceeding, as can 
be seen from a reading of the statute and the authorities, 
as well as a Utah case considering disconnection, is a political 
one to determine city boundaries for purposes of taxation 
and mutual obligations and rights as between the governing 
body and its citizens. It was never intended, and there is nothing 
in the statute that indicates that it was, to be a means of 
depriving a city of property it owns. Cf. Title 10, Chapter 4, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (substantially the same as §§ 
288 et seq. of Compiled Laws of 1907); Plutus Mining Com-
pany v. Or me, 76 Utah 286, 289 Pac. 132 (1930); 1 Antieau 
on Municipal Corporation Law, § 1.24. 
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(If plaintiff argues that the city has no power to maintain 
streets outside the city limits, the answer is that the question 
of ' 'power"—apart from ownership of the street—is no concern 
of hers. It is a question between the city and its taxpayers.) 
Taken all in all, then, the claim of estoppel as raised 
by the plaintiff in the above case is based solely upon inaction 
(one type of which was failure to oppose disconnection) by 
the city over a number of years, but without proof of any 
particular reliance by the plaintiff, without proof of any expen-
diture, in general, without proof of any extraordinary circum-
stances, but with proof that the plaintiff and her predecessors 
have taken advantage of the fact that taxes were not being 
assessed against the property. The plaintiff's circumstances are 
ordinary, not extraordinary. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly establishes that there was a city 
street between Parcels 99 and 113 at the time of the entry 
by Mayor Luther T. Tuttle under the Townsite Act. This is 
shown by an official map made at approximately the time 
of the entry, certified by the County Surveyor, and by the 
declaratory statements and adjudications of the claimants to 
the property. 
Plaintiff has failed to prove facts sufficient to raise an 
estoppel against the city. While there may have been non-use 
of the street over a period of years, non-use isn't enough; and 
there has not been reliance and expenditure by the plaintiff 
such as to justify application of the doctrine of estoppel. 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is no evidence that the city took any action at any 
time that would constitute abandonment or vacation of the 
street between Parcels 99 and 113. 
The disconnection proceeding filed in 1910 has no further 
effect that to change the political boundaries of Manti City. 
Even if it were held that jurisdiction over the streets was 
affected by the proceeding, the result would be to put the street 
as a street under the county's control—but it would have no 
effect on the street as property. [The plaintiff has not shown 
herself to be a proper party to contest the city's right to spend 
tax money on a street it owns outside the political boundaries 
of the city.] 
The plaintiff's claim of estoppel is not well-founded, since 
she has failed to show that the city ever did anything except 
fail to take affirmative action to maintain the street and 
failed to make an appearance in an action in which certain 
taxpayers wanted to get out of the city. Under the cases this 
is not sufficient to raise an estoppel against the city, particularly 
where the property owner has not relied upon the inaction to 
his substantial detriment. The plaintiff failed to make the kind 
of proof that would support estoppel in any kind of case, let 
alone one in which the rights of the public in the city streets 
is concerned. Failure to estop the city won't lead to any in-
justice—gross or otherwise. 
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The Findings of Fact of the trial court are supported by 
ample evidence, the Conclusions of Law are correct, and the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dilworth Woolley 
Manti, Utah 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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APPENDIX A 
UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
Washington 25, D. C. 
July 2, 1959 
Mr. Bryce E. Roe * * * . 
Dear Mr. Roe: 
In response to your letter of June 18 we have checked 
our records concerning the entry for Manti Town Site, Utah. 
We find that Luther T. Tuttle, Mayor of Manti, purchased 
at the Land Office at Salt Lake City, Utah, on May 15, 1871, 
the SV2 sec. 1, EVySfE^, NE1/4SE1/4 sec. 11, all sec. 12, T. 18 S., 
R. 2 E., and lots 1, 2, 3, 4 sec. 7, and lot 7 sec. 6, T. 18 S.,R. 3 E., 
Salt Lake Meridian, Utah. Full payment for the land was made 
in the amount of $1600, being at the rate of $1.25 an acre for 
the 1280 acres purchased. 
Cash Certificate No. 636, Salt Lake City, issued to Mayor 
Tuttle on May 15, 1871, the date he purchased the land, fol-
lowed by the patent which issued to him, in trust for the 
inhabitants of Manti, on September 2, 1872. This patent is 
recorded in our patent record volume 2, page 162. A certified 
photostatic copy thereof may be obtained for $1. You may also 
obtain a similar copy of the cash certificate and the cash receipt 
for $1 each. Your remittance for this purpose should be by 
check or postal money order made payable to the Bureau of 
Land Management. 
Our records disclose no other papers, nor any plat of the 
town site. Such plats were usually filed with the county re-
corder's office of the county where the town site was located. 
Sincerely yours, 
For the Director: 
/ s / S. C. Nichols 
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